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I. Introduction
Young innovating companies constitute risky investments because
they lack the necessary track record and often lock their capital in
intangibles.1 Entrepreneurs wish to secure some financial backing in order
to grow their business; but, while they know their business inside-out,
potential investors must be convinced to invest. To defeat information
asymmetries,2 entrepreneurs and potential investors must rely on
observable characteristics or other manufactured signals to make
investment decisions.3
While these innovative startups are ill-suited for bank loans,4 they are
prime candidates for venture capital (VC) fund investments.5 To elect their
investments targets, VCs rely on characteristics and signals that can be
observed before and during the negotiations. For instance, before the
negotiations, potential investors valorize the prior experience and education
of a fund-seeking entrepreneur;6 or during negotiations, an entrepreneur can

1. Bronwyn H. Hall, The Financing of Innovative Firms, 1 R. ECON. & INSTITUTIONS 1,
2–5 (2010) (discussing how innovative companies have most of their assets in research and
development (R&D) and this R&D constitute an intangible asset, mostly in the form of human
capital).
2. Id. at 7. Information asymmetries were first formally discussed by George A. Akerlof
in The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QUARTERLY J.
ECON. 488 (1970) where he describes how market with information asymmetry may lead to good
investments to not enter the market.
3. Hall, supra note 1, at 8 (using the example of R&D expenditure as a signal around the
information asymmetry problem).
4. “Low salvage values relative to the original investment makes these [intangible assets
created by innovation investment] unsuitable for debt finance in spite of the tax advantage, so that
firms whose investments are mostly intangible will rely more heavily on retained earnings and
equity.” Id. at 10. Citing previous empirical studies, Hall, supra note 1, argues that young
innovative companies are often cash strapped, this lack of cash affects R&D, and they rely more
on venture financing because they are more willing to take risks. Id. at 21–22.
5. ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL & THE FINANCE OF
INNOVATION, 10–13 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the type of companies in which venture capital
funds invest).
6. David H. Hsu, Experienced Entrepreneurial Founders, Organizational Capital, and
Venture Capital Funding, 36 RESEARCH POL’Y 722 (2007), David H. Hsu empirically tests
whether prior experience and education affect the fund receives through direct ties as well as the
valuation of the venture. He finds that prior experience has a statistically significant effect on the
likelihood of receiving funds through direct ties as well as increases the pre-investment valuation
of the company. He finds, however, that education has mixed and sometimes inconclusive
effects; yet, in the Internet industry, holding a doctorate increases the likelihood of receiving
funds through direct ties as well as increases preinvestment valuation in a statistically significant
way.
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reveal her company’s potential if she is willing to accept staged financing7
or relinquish some corporate control.8
When investing, VCs also consider company characteristics such as its
innovative potential.
Investors seek innovative companies because
innovations can help them profit based on Schumpeterian principles.9
These principles argue that innovation helps generate profits in one of two
ways: innovation helps create differentiated products or innovation helps
produce the same product but at a lower cost.10
Investors struggle to assess innovation potential.11 First, investors do
not fully observe this potential because inventors do not wish to disclose
their innovation.12 Second, even if inventors clearly disclose their ideas,
entrepreneurs also have an incentive to exaggerate their potential.13

7. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a venture capital market: lessons from the American
experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003). Ronald J. Gilson explains how contracts between
venture capital firms and startup entrepreneurs can be used to alleviate some of the risk,
uncertainties, information asymmetries, and agency cost linked with the investor-investee
relationship including using staged financing, control, monitoring, etc. Stage financing falls
within this category. Id. at 1080.
8. Id. at 1091.
9. “[T]he bulk of private fortunes is, in capitalist society, directly or indirectly the result of
the process of which innovation is the ‘prime mover.’” Joseph A. Schumpeter, BUSINESS
CYCLES, A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST
PROCESS, 104 (1939).
10. Id. at 85–86. Innovations shift the innovator’s cost curve and allow innovators to
capture some of the demand.
11. This issue does not refer to the difficulties measuring innovation or innovation potential
because innovation is an abstract concept. This issue refers to the observation of innovation
potential because innovators know more about their inventions than outside observers.
12. Disclosing innovation makes it available to potential competitors because ideas and
innovations are non-rival and can be reproduced. The “non-rival character of knowledge . . .
means that once an invention is known, everyone can use it with no additional R&D cost.” David
Encaoua, Dominique Guellec & Catalina Martínez Patent systems for encouraging innovation:
Lessons from economic analysis, 35 RESEARCH POL’Y 1423, 1424 (2006). This issue is referred
as the Arrow’s information paradox where disclosing the information destroys its value.
KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962) (explaining the paradox that the information’s “value
for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it
without cost”). The investors may not copy the information herself but the innovator may not be
able to prevent its reproduction after disclosing it. The initial inventors may still enjoy a firstmover advantage and hence benefit from her invention, but she might not be able to benefit as
much as she would have, had she not disclosed.
13. Mattew Beacham & Bipasa Datta, Who becomes the winner? Effects of venture capital
on firms’ innovative incentives: a theoretical investigation, Univ. of York, Working Paper (2013).
Mattew Beacham and Bipasa Datta present a two-period theoretical model explaining the
incentive that entrepreneurs have to put high amounts of efforts in the first period in order to
obtain venture capital financing in the second period.
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Therefore, investors struggle to forecast the market potential especially at
the early innovations stages.
Fund seeking companies and investors rely on selection criteria that
address information asymmetries and separate companies according to their
potential. In the software industry, entrepreneurs and investors have
arguably used patent portfolios to separate companies according to their
potential.14
Patents are perceived as incentivizing innovation by granting the
holder a monopoly in exchange for disclosing information about the
invention;15 however, in the software industry, patents do not seem to fulfill
this function.16 The software industry moves too fast for the patent system
and for the innovator to profit on her monopoly power. This is because a
patent takes on average of almost three years to be granted,17 while most
software users would have changed software at least once during that time
period.18 Even if software patents remain relevant, its holders have hardly
enforced them.19
Software patents instead are often used as innovation-potential signals.
Software startups rarely hold patents.20 This scarcity makes them good

14. Ronald J. Mann, Do Patent Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 961 (2005).
15. Catherine M. Cottle & Robert P. Greenspoon, Don’t Assume a Can Opener:
Confronting Patent Economic Theories with Licensing and Enforcement Reality, 12 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 194, 205 (2011) (discussing the reward theory of patents that “argues that
patents incentivize innovation by increasing the benefits associated with obtaining a patent”
because it creates a monopoly market that the innovator can exploit).
16. Id. at 209–10 (discussing the prospective theory and how patents disseminate
information such as declaring to competing firms of successful research and allowing holders to
exchange information).
17. Performance Accountability Report 190 Table 4 (2013), USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/
about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2013PAR.pdf. This table shows that the average pendency for a
Computer Architecture, Software & Information Security was 2 years and 8 months.
18. The lifespan of software has been dropping quickly. A survey from 1992 cites a 10.1
year lifespan for software in Japan. Tetsuo Tamai & Yohsuke Torimitsu, Software Lifetime and
its Evolution Process over Generations, SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE PROC. 63 (1992). “Another
survey in Germany from the year 2000 claims that more than seventy-five percent of customers
are replacing their software each year and almost fifty percent are replacing them every six
months.” Sylvain Perchaud, Software Patents and Innovation, 1 J. OF INFO. L. & TECH. (2003).
19. Mann uses his interview with IBM to explain how some companies have a more
“lenient enforcement of their IP rights.” IBM offers nonexclusive licenses and does not wish to
enforce its intellectual property through litigation. Mann, supra note 15, at 1005–06. This seems
to indicate that the cost of enforcing patents outweighs the benefits in the software industry.
Software innovators often prefer to cross-license their patents.
20. For instance, in a 2005 survey, a minority of software startups held patents by the time
they received their first round of venture capital financing. In comparison, in the biotech industry
the majority of companies held a patent before receiving their first investments. In Patents,
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signals. Software companies often file patent(s) later in their lifecycle to
differentiate their products, to facilitate cross-licensing, and to signal
expertise and knowhow.21 First, this paper analyzes whether patents have
been used as innovation-potential signals as well as how they help investors
select which projects to finance. This paper argues that VC funds have
indirectly encouraged the proliferation of software patents.
Patent scarcity also makes startups vulnerable to potential claims. A
2013 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted an
increase in patent infringement litigation with multi-defendants between
2007 and 2011 and 89 percent of this increase was attributable to software
patent litigation.22 Second, this paper analyzes how the impact in the
increase in patent litigation affected the software industry and the signaling
value of patents. The second section also discusses how Patent Assertion
Entities (PAEs) have proliferated, how PAE litigations have increased, and
how they impact the value of patents.
Both VCs and PAEs rely on patents in different ways. By using
patents in an unexpected way, PAEs have complicated VCs’ company
valuation. Indirectly, VCs have fed into the patent assertion entity
problem. This paper presents empirical evidence that PAEs have impacted
the behavior of VCs. Finally, this paper discusses how VCs have been
impacted by PAEs and the role that VCs play to hinder the PAE
phenomenon. This paper argues that VCs can do more to hinder the impact
of PAEs.

II. Are Patents Good Signals for Investors?
On the demand side, most young companies rely on inside finance to
start their businesses but in order to grow and flourish, they turn to outside
financing.23 To gain access to outside finance, innovators need to convince
Venture Capital, and Software Startups, Ronald J. Mann and Thomas W. Sager compare the
biotech industry to the software industry. Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture
Capital, and Software Startups, 36 RESEARCH POL’Y 193 (2007). In High Technology
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, Stuart J.H.
Graham, et al., compared the biotechnology, medical device, software/internet, and IT hardware
industries. While Graham et al., also find that VC backing correlated with patenting and that the
software industry behave differently than the biotech industry, they report higher patent numbers
than Mann et al. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009).
21. Mann, supra note 14, at 985–96.
22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 14 (2013).
23. See e.g. Metrick, supra note 5, at 17, exhibit 1-6; Valérie Revest & Alessandro Sapio,
Financing Technology-Based Small Firms in Europe: What Do We Know?, 39 SMALL BUS.
ECON. 179 (2012) (showing that high-tech European companies rely on internal funds at the early
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outsiders to invest. To convince outsiders, innovators can resort to sending
the “correct” signals.
On the supply side, VC funds provide finances to startups. Since most
VC funds have a short lifespan,24 they rely on selling their stakes to profit
(instead of collecting dividends).25 A successful sale involves an initial
public offering (IPO) where the VCs’ stakes are sold to a public or to
another company in case of an acquisition.26 To profit, a VC needs to
successfully convince a public or another company about the investment’s
soundness. As a result, sending signals can help convince outsiders.
Over its lifetime, a company might send signals to VCs to get initial
financing and to the public to get further financing. Patents can serve as a
signal on both occasions. This section investigates how startups use
patents as signals. The section concludes by discussing whether these
signals work in the software industry.
A. From Patenting to Investments

Investors are less interested in defining and measuring innovation and
more interested in profiting from innovation.27 VCs want the companies
they fund to innovate because innovation lead to higher profits according to
Schumpeterian principles. Scholars have debated over the role of VC
funds in the innovation process: Do VC funds encourage innovation?28 Or

stage and outside financing at a later stage); William B. Gartner, Casey J. Frid, & John C.
Alexander, Financing the Emerging Firm, 39 SMALL BUS. ECON. 745 (2012) (estimating the
most common source of financing for young firms).
24. VC funds are a limited partnership built to usually last ten years. They are extendable
under certain circumstances. See e.g., William A. Sahlman, The structure and governance of
venture-capital organizations, J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The
Venture Capital Revolution. 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 145 (2001).
25. Metrick, et al., supra note 5, at 178–80. Profiting upon exit contrasts with other
investors who profit from collecting interest on loan repayments like banks or dividends like
long-term entrepreneur-investors.
26. Id. at 179.
27. See e.g., Zvi Griliches, R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence, NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 315–19 (1998) (discussing how stock market prices respond to
changes in patent filings and reporting mixed evidence about this impact); James Bessen, Jennifer
Ford, and Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patents Trolls, 34 REGULATION 26
(2011-2012) (discussing the reaction of investors and the stock market to filing patent suits and
showing that investors may overreact).
28. What constitutes an innovation is beyond the scope of this paper. For simplicity, a
“product innovation is the introduction of a good or service that is new or significantly improved
with respect to its characteristics or intended uses.” OECD & EUROSTAT, OSLO MANUAL 48
OECD PUBLISHING (3d ed. 2005). “This includes significant improvements in technical
specifications, components and materials, incorporated software, user friendliness or other
functional characteristics.” Id. Beside product innovation, the OECD and Eurostat identify three
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do they accurately spot innovative companies?29 The truth is probably
somewhere in between these two views.30
This section analyzes these innovation selecting and the innovation
inducing hypotheses. Because innovation is difficult to measure, scholars
have used patents as a proxy for innovation.31 This section argues that
patents seemingly play such a proxy role for investors as well.
On the one hand, if investors can only spot but cannot encourage
innovation, investors must carefully select the companies. They must find
ways to separate companies with high innovative potential from companies
with low innovative potential, and to invest in the former.32 This task can,
however, prove difficult.
First, entrepreneurs cannot directly exhibit their innovativeness
because disclosing their content can destroy its potential value.33 Second,
innovative potential can be faked: if a fund-seeking entrepreneur knows
how investors select companies, he or she will try to exhibit the sought-out
characteristics, which includes innovativeness.34 These two problems force
inventors to indirectly signal their innovativeness. A good signal is costly
enough to separate individuals with low and high potential,35 and cheap
enough to allow recipients to access it.36
types of innovation: process innovations, marketing innovations, and organizational innovations.
Id. at 47. These last three types of innovation are beyond the scope of this paper.
29. See Masayuki Hirukawa & Masako Ueda, Venture Capital and Innovation: Which is
First?, 16 PAC. ECON. REV. 421 (2011).
30. “Firms that seek venture-funding appear to be patenting more actively prior to the
funding event (and for the purpose of securing funding), and venture-capital investors appear
much less willing to fund companies that hold no patents.” Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1280.
31. Patents are legal title to a monopoly over the innovation. Griliches, supra note 27, at
289. Companies may decide to not protect their innovation or use another form of protection
(e.g., trade secret) or the innovation may simply not be patentable. Id. at 296. Thus, patents may
constitute an imperfect proxy. Id. at 301 (discussing the validity of using patent as a measure of
inventive output). Griliches argues that patents may provide a good indicator when comparing
behavior across firms and across industry but is a less accurate indicator within firms. Id. The
size of the company (as measured by R&D expenditure) impacts the relationship between R&D
and patent filings. Id. at 303. The propensity to file a patent for invention differs according to
industries as well. Id. at 308.
32. See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 5, at 123–35 (highlighting the different failure rates
VC funds experience depending on the stage of financing involvement). VC funds that invest at
earlier stages often face higher failure rate. Id.
33. See Arrow, supra note 12, at 615 (discussing the information value paradox).
34. See Matthew Beacham & Bipasa Datta, Who Becomes the Winner? Effects of Venture
Capital on Firms’ Innovative Incentives – A Theoretical Investigation, 7–10 (Univ. of York,
Working Paper No. 13/33, 2013) (building a theoretical model to show the different incentives of
companies with high or low skillsets).
35. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355, 358 (1973) (discussing the
role that signal costs play in effectively defeating information asymmetries and using the example
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Patents have served as an efficient signal because they are costly to
produce, verifiable, and costless to access.37 First, patents are often quite
costly to obtain,38 and they generally are costly to retain.39 If an innovator
is rational, she will only file a patent if she expects the benefits to outweigh
the costs. Signaling the innovative potential to outsiders constitutes such a
benefit. A patent that signals her innovative potential may even justify the
patenting cost40 when she may have otherwise used other means to protect
her innovation –– such as trade secrets.
Second, patents are verifiable and verified. The government verifies
patents in two principal ways. A patent office must first verify and approve
that the patent fulfills certain criteria before a patent becomes valid.41 The
of education as a costly and time consuming signal that job seekers may elect to signal to
employers their worth); Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 655–660 (2002)
(discussing the importance of making the signal costly enough to avoid multiple equilibria). A
good signal should also reflect the underlying quality being signaled. See id. at 671.
36. Long, supra note 35, at 644 (“The strategy of firms will thus be to convey in-formation
about their positive attributes in a way that presents low acquisition and verification costs to the
intended recipients.”). The issue is twofold: Outsiders cannot directly observe innovation
potential and they cannot trust what they are told. An outsider may not be able to directly
observe the innovative potential because innovators wish to keep it secret and young companies
may not have yet realized this potential. An outsider may not trust an entrepreneur to directly
express the truth about the company’s innovative potential because of the distorted incentive to
exhibit the sought-out characteristics. Of course, an entrepreneur knows more about her company
than outsiders and this unequal knowledge creates information asymmetries that have been
usually resolved through signaling. IPO and investment literature focused on the signal theory.
See, e.g,. James C. Brau, & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory
and Practice, 61 J. FIN. 399 (2006) (performing a survey of company officers to determine what
signals are important for a successful IPO).
37. Carolin Haeussler, Dietmar Harhoff & Elisabeth Müller, To Be Financed or Not: The
Role of Patents for Venture Capital Financing (Munich Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 200902, 2009) (investigating, empirically, whether patent filing and patent quality impact the
likelihood of receiving financing in the German and British biotechnology industry). Haessler et
al., found that having patent applications increased the likelihood of receiving funding, and that
the changes in the patent application stock provided results that were more statistically
significant. Id. at 22. Patent quality also increased the likelihood of receiving funding in a
statistically significant way. Id.
38. For instance, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 2013 27 (2013) cites $10,000 patent fees for electronic/computer in 2012.
39. For more information on the fee schedules, see USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm
(last visited Dec. 15, 2014).
40. Long, supra note 35, at 627, argues that, “[P]atents can serve as a means of reducing
informational asymmetries between patentees and observers. The ability to convey information
credibly to observers at low cost is a highly valuable function of patents. . . .” Using a model, she
later argues the information cost reducing role of patents can explain why patents may be worth
the cost, aside from the rent they produce. Id. at 644.
41. The criteria are different in most jurisdictions. For instance, the USPTO verifies that
the invention is: (1) useful, 35 U.S.C § 101 (2015); (2) novel, 35 U.S.C § 102 (2015); and (3)

9 - GABISON_PAE-EDITED-PROD-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

WINTER 2016]

PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY

11/13/2015 3:41 PM

107

courts also legitimize any patents that have successfully been litigated and
upheld.42 Similarly, industry participants can signal the value of a patent
through citations43 because subsequent patents must cite patents which they
rely on.44 In conclusion, even if an investor does not have the required
expertise, she can still easily access this signal and its value because other
entities (whether governmental or other industry participants) vouch for the
patent’s quality.
However, an investor does not have to rely solely on these entities to
assess the signal’s value because she can research the patent’s content. To
obtain a patent, innovators must disclose the contents of their invention.45
An investor can access the patent office’s records and read the documents
relating to the patent. Because VC fund managers specialize in an
economic sector, they often possess the expertise required to evaluate
patents.46 Patent disclosure helps dispel some information asymmetries
without destroying the information’s (and innovation’s) value.47 Empirical
evidences support that VCs use company portfolio when deciding whether
non-obvious, 35 U.S.C § 103 (2015). Long, supra note 35, at 667-68, argues at that “[t]he PTO is
an imperfect mechanism . . . for assuring that information contained in a patent is credible”
because the evaluation can be rushed and incomplete.
42. During a patent litigation, a court can decide on the validity of the patent along the same
criteria used by the patent office to grant a patent. Furthermore, the court must decide whether
infringement occurred; hence, the court decides upon the boundaries of the patent. Patent
enforcement is an even more costly signal because it involves more actions: monitoring
infringements and costly litigating court. GAO Study, supra note 22, at 9–11 (discussing the
enforcement of patents).
43. Haeussler et al., supra note 37, at 16 (discussing the value of patents as signal to obtain
financing. They investigate as well the quality of the signal sent by patents: they estimate patent
quality using patent citations because patents that receive citation are considered prior art. They
find that “companies with highly cited patents receive VCs financing faster than firms with
infrequently cited patent applications.”).
44. Long, supra note 35, at 652. Investors can also look at the original patent to look at
what patents it cites and benchmark this patent with respect to previous patents; Samuel Kortum
& Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON.
674, 689–90 (2000) (arguing that citations and litigations are two indicators of a patent’s value).
45. This disclosure is the quid pro quo for gaining an enforceable legal monopoly. The
patent holder can exploit this monopoly power or outsource the exploitation through licensing or
selling agreements or refuse to exploit it as well.
46. Long, supra note 35, at 666 (discussing the cost of evaluating signals like patent and
requiring the intervention of experts); George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the
World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, (2001) (discussing the importance of
intermediaries like venture capital funds and banks because they provide specialized knowledge
and can evaluate projects); Olav Sorenson & Toby E. Stuart, Syndication Networks and the
Spatial Distribution of Venture Capital Investments, 106 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1546, 1577 (2001)
(empirically testing the impact of industry experience and finding that industry experience have a
statistically significant on the likelihood of financing a company).
47. Haeussler et al., supra note 37.
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to invest,48 even if patents constitute a problematic proxy for innovative
potential.49
On the other hand, if VCs can encourage companies to innovate,50
they will encourage innovation only if they can profit from it. To
encourage profitable innovation, investors must align their incentives with
the company managers or inventor’s incentive. Realigning incentives can,
however, prove to be difficult because, by investing, VCs separate control
from capital and dis-align these incentives; hence, VCs inadvertently create
an agency problem.51
To overcome this agency problem, VCs have mostly relied on two
solutions.52 First, investors can realign their incentives with the innovator’s
through financial inducements.53 For instance, investors can request a stage
financing clause, which specifies that an entrepreneur and its VC agree on
installment investments that are disbursed only if the entrepreneur reaches
certain milestones (e.g., prototype, mass production, etc.).54 This method
assures that an innovator-entrepreneur remains motivated to develop an
innovation along a VC-selected timeline.
Second, investors can realign incentives through direct intervention.
By this way, VCs can monitor and control some activities. For instance,
investors can demand that the innovator-entrepreneur yields some positions
48. See e.g. Dirk Engel and Max Keilbach, Firm-level Implications of Early Stage Venture
Capital Investment – An Empirical Investigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 150 (2007) (empirically
testing and finding that German venture-capital-backed startups have more patent filing than
comparable non-venture-capital-backed startups but they are already filing more application
before the engagement of venture capital funds, which means that funds invest in companies that
patents instead of encouraging patenting).
49. See supra note 31.
50. Kortum & Lerner, supra note 44 (attempting to estimate the impact of venture capital
activity on patent filing controlling for R&D investment). They find a positive relationship
between venture capital investment and patenting. They further test the casual direction of the
relationship. They use the liberalization of investment rules, which only impact venture capital
funding, to control for the causality of the effects. They find that increasing venture financing
increases patenting.
51. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. OF
L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (discussing the issues associated with control, which makes the decision,
from separating ownership, which bears the consequences of decisions because transaction costs
lead incomplete contracts).
52. Gilson, supra note 7, also discusses the use of compensation schemes involving
performance incentives and exit call option at 1083–85.
53. Id. at 1079 (“Staged financing aligns the interests of the venture capital fund and the
entrepreneur by creating a substantial performance incentive. If the portfolio company does not
meet the milestone whose completion was funded in the initial round of financing, the venture
capital fund has the power to shut the project down by declining to fund the project’s next
round.”).
54. Id.

9 - GABISON_PAE-EDITED-PROD-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

WINTER 2016]

PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY

11/13/2015 3:41 PM

109

of control in the company. VCs often request seats on the company’s
board of directors55 to remain involved and monitor the company’s
activities. Relinquishing too many seats (and control) may, however,
signal a poor investment because it can indicate that an entrepreneur has
little leverage through outside opportunities.56 Investors would then need
to screen companies for the appropriate level of malleability.57
Even under this VC-inducing innovation hypothesis, patents can be
used as signal. Since VCs profit from exiting companies, they must send
the proper signal to attract outside investors.58 VCs can signal before
exiting through patenting the company’s innovative and profit potential.
This hypothesis has been verified empirically.59
Under both the selecting and inducing hypothesis, patenting plays a
role as signal. While this section examined the general signaling value of
patents, their value varies from industry to industry. The following section
discusses the role of patents in the software industry.
B. The Software Industry

Software patents continue to create a debate. In the United States,
software innovators can patent and/or copyright their software
innovations.60 Patenting software protects processes and against reverse

55. Id. at 1082-83.
56. In Contracts and Exits in Venture Capital Finance, 21 REV. FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1947
(2008), Douglas Cumming estimates that venture capital fund managers who exercise more
control are more likely to exit via an acquisition than IPO or a write-off using a sample of
European venture capital backed companies. He argues that more VCs’ control rights are usually
associated with less promising companies. Id. at 1950.
57. VCs need to balance the need to exercise control to encourage innovation without
stifling or wrongly steering innovation. The VC’s expertise becomes important in this context
because she may be able to understand the industry specific difficulties.
58. “Because entry and exit is more difficult for investors in a privately held firm, such
investors can be expected to place a higher marginal value on gaining information about each
firm’s attributes than would investors in publicly held firms.” Long, supra note 36, at 673.
59. “This finding suggests that patents cast an important signal not only to VC audiences
but also to investors in public equity markets.” David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Patents
as Quality Signals for Entrepreneurial Ventures, Academy of Management Proceedings 25
(2008) (estimating the impact of patent as signal at different stages of a startup financing cycle
and finding that patent application stock is strongly correlated with the likelihood of a venture’s
final funding was through an IPO).
60. See e.g. Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 539 (2003) (stating that “computer programs are eligible for protection
under both copyright – as creative works of authorship — and patent — as items of functional
utility”).
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engineering.61 Patenting grants an innovator protection over the software’s
innovative sections.62 Copyrighting software grants longer protection63 at a
lower cost.64 Copyright protects against literal copying.65 This option
between patenting and copyrighting makes software unique. Software
patent and copyright have their upsides and downsides, which are beyond
the scope of this paper.
Patents can serve to incentivize innovators by granting them a right to
exclude others to use their innovation. However, in the software industry,
patents have arguably been used to signal potential. First, the software
patent granting process and lifecycle support that patents are more of a
signal than an asset: a software patent takes on average almost three years
to be granted whereas users update or change software on average once in
that period.66 Hence, by the time a software innovator can take advantage
of her monopoly, users have moved on.
Second, VCs backing is correlated with higher patenting levels. A
2008 study reports that software startups backed by VCs applied or hold
5.9 patents on average as compared to 1.7 for the software startup general
population; and that 67 percent of VCs backed software startups held at
least one patent while only 24 percent of the software startup general
population.67 While VCs backed companies may be more innovative
(selection hypothesis), non-VCs backed companies may simply not wish to
patent because they do not have a need for it.
More particularly, software companies generally delay patenting68 and
this delay supports the signaling argument. While budget constraints may

61. Julie E. Cohen and Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2001) arguing that patenting should not protect reverse
engineering efforts.
62. Id.
63. Patents are valid for up to 20 years from the date of filing (35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)) while
copyright protection are valid for up to “the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s
death” (17 U.S. Code § 302).
64. American Intellectual Property Law Association, Report of the Economic Survey 2013,
(2013) cites $350 copyright fees and $10,000 patent fees for electrical/computer in 2012. For
more information on the fee schedules, see U.S. Copyright Office http://copyright.gov/docs/
fees.html; United State Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2014).
65. “In the language often used by courts interpreting the Copyright Act, this issue boils
down to the protectibility of literal copying of ‘non-literal’ elements of a software program.”
Weiser, supra note 60, n. 13.
66. See footnote supra note 17 & 18.
67. Graham et al., supra note 20, Table 1.
68. See e.g., the discussion in Mann and Sager, supra note 20 (estimating the differences
between the biotechnology industry and the software industry and finding lower patenting rates
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dictate this delay,69 VC funds invest millions into software companies70 and
can afford to file a patent. If software patents are mainly viewed as a
valuable asset, a rational VC should not delay patenting (to protect their
investments) because of value discounting71 and knowing the speed of the
industry.72 VCs must delay because software patent value is affected
overtime.73 If software patents are mainly viewed as a valuable signal,
patents only become valuable when VCs prepare to exit.74
Finally, as one study reports, software patents have traditionally not
generated revenue streams or been heavily enforced prior to 2005 as
reported by one study.75 This trend has changed and a GAO study reveals
and a large gap between both industry before the first investment rounds) and Mann, supra note
21 (arguing on the differences of patenting in the software industry).
69. GAO Study, supra note 22, reports that “a few representatives of venture capital and
software startup firms told [GAO] that they do not always apply for patents until their companies
are well established because patent attorneys are expensive, and the process is time consuming.”
Id. at 34–35. Graham et al., supra note 20, find that software startups patent less often and with
lesser intensity than biotechnology, medical device, and IT hardware startups. Id. at Table 1.
And Table 2 shows that the most cited reason for not seeking patent protection is the cost of
patenting in the software industry.
70. See infra Section IV. A. (explaining that between 2005 and 2012, VCs invested on
average $5.6 million into each software company according to a dataset from Dow Jones).
71. See generally, What is the Formula for Calculating Net Present Value?,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/021115/whatformulacalculating
netpresentvaluenpvexcel.asp. The present value of a patent is the sum of the marginal profits
received from filing a patent over the life of a patent as compared to not filing a patent. This
value is higher today than it is tomorrow based on the future value discount/present value
calculation of economics since people discount the future because of its uncertainties, inflation,
and other factors such as preferences. However, because a competitor may be able to file a
similar patent, filing a patent tomorrow may be worthless if someone else filed it. In other words,
rational individuals value the present more than the future.
72. See generally What is the Formula for Calculating Net Present Value?,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/021115/whatformulacalculating
netpresentvaluenpvexcel.asp. The implicit assumption is that the value of a patent diminishes
because of present value discounting of future value, inflation, and because of competing
researcher willing to patent the same idea. In other words, assets are more valuable today than in
the future.
73. See generally Inefficient Market, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/05/032905.asp?rp=i. The discussion assumes that VCs can sell patents. If the market for
patent is efficient, then patenting an exploiting the innovation itself or patenting and selling the
patent should be worth the same. While markets for patent are likely inefficient because
information asymmetries and search cost to find a buyer, a VC should likely be able to recoup the
cost of patent filing.
74. Delaying patenting –– instead of patenting or not patenting –– does not seem rational,
unless the value of patent as a signal changes over time because its value as an asset should not.
A priori, startups may be as innovative as incumbent companies; a nonestablished company
seeking a path may not need to signal its potential while an established one seeking further fund
may need to signal its potential.
75. See discussion supra note 19.
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that software patent litigation has increased more rapidly than non-software
litigation not involving software between 2007 and 2011.76 The next
section discusses software patent litigation and particularly PAEs, which
have been playing a central role in this change in philosophy. Seemingly,
to gain access to funds, VCs have incentivized software entrepreneurs to
seek funding through patents. Accordingly, VCs have indirectly fed into
the litigious changes.

III. Patent Assertion Entities Impacting the Software Industry
The previous section has showed that software patents play a role as a
signal; yet, they remain a potential asset. Still, VCs may prefer companies
with large patent portfolios because these portfolios may guarantee larger
profits through patent-granted monopolies. These portfolios can also be
sold in case of failure.77
Moreover, patents can be strategically used to increase the
competitor’s costs. For instance, through a patent, its holder gains an
associated right to exclude others from using her patented innovation.78
Patents can be strategically used to defend against competitors’ claims. For
instance, a company can use its patents as defense during an infringement
lawsuit or leverage their patents to instigate counter-claims.79
Recently, some entities have disrupted the software patent ecosystem.
These entities enforce but do not utilize patents. Their activities have
changed how market participants value patents as assets. This section
discusses non-practicing entities. It argues that these entities help as well

76. See GAO Study, supra note 22, at Figure 5.
77. See, e.g., John E. Dubiansky, An Analysis for the Valuation of Venture Capital-Funded
Startup Firm Patents, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 170 (2006) (discussing the issues venture
capitalists face valuing patent before their sell and give the example of VC firms who specialized
in reselling intellectual property of failed startups).
78. Holders enforce this right of exclusion through litigation: litigating may conclude in an
injunction ordering the infringer to not use the patented innovation or in royalty damages
transferring funds from the infringer to the patent holder; however, the court may also hold that
the alleged infringer did not infringe or that the patent is invalid. Injunctions are more difficult to
obtain: “In the 2006 eBay decision, the Supreme Court ruled that district courts should not
assume an injunction was automatically needed in patent infringement cases and instead should
use the same test used in other cases to determine whether to award the plaintiff an injunction.
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). According to several legal
commentators we spoke with, this decision has generally made it more difficult for NPEs to
obtain injunctions in the courts and has led them to pursue exclusion orders at ITC –– although
there may have been other reasons for the increase in filings, including the relative speed of
proceedings at ITC.” GAO Study, supra note 22, at 11 n.26.
79. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1300–02.
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as hinder innovation and concludes by looking at the software industry and
the impacts of these entities have on the financing of innovation.
A. Patent Assertion Entities Impacting the Innovation Ecosystem

Non-practicing entities encompass a multitude of entities. These
entities live along a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum are inventors
who do not exploit their patents. Universities and research centers often
perform research and file a patent based on their research, but do not
develop products or services that utilize these patents (but may license
them).80
At the other end of the spectrum are entities that exploit patents but do
not invest in R&D or invent. For instance, some organizations have
developed a business model that relies on purchasing patents and licensing
them or enforcing them for revenues.81 These organizations have been
credited with driving the increase in patent litigation at a large cost to
society.82
In other words, these entities monetize patents but do not utilize
patents: they profit either by acquiring and licensing patents83 or by
litigating infringers.84 The companies, “whose business model primarily
focuses on purchasing and asserting patents,”85 are often referred to as
patent monetization entities or patent assertion entities (PAE),86 to

80. GAO Study, supra note 22, at 2.
81. Id. at 19.
82. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 387, 389 (2014) (estimating that non-practicing entities cost accrued $29 billion of direct
costs in 2011.) This figure however, has been criticized for being overinflated, David L.
Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the role of non-practicing entities in the patent system, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 425, 433, 440 (2014) (arguing that this figure is biased upward because it
includes litigation that may have been brought regardless and because monetary transfers between
entities differ from costs to economists.)
83. Thought, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. 12-cv-05601-WHO (N.D. Cal. 2014).
84. Pragmatus AV, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995 (E.D. Va. 2011)
(stating that the plaintiff is a “‘non-practicing entity,’ meaning that it does not research and
develop new technology but rather acquires patents, licenses the technology, and sues alleged
infringers. [Plaintiff]’s main line of business is enforcing its intellectual property rights, and a
large part of that task involves threatening to file lawsuits.”).
85. FTC, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with
Competition, at 94–103 (Mar. 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/11
0307patentreport.pdf.
86. “Some NPEs simply buy patents from others for the purpose of asserting them for
profit; these NPEs are known as patent monetization entities (PME).” The GAO study, supra
note 22, at 2. But “[t]he Federal Trade Commission uses the related term ‘patent assertion
entities’ to focus on entities whose business model solely focuses on asserting typically purchased
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distinguish them from other nonpracticing entities (NPEs) like university
and research institutions, which develop technologies.87 PAEs are
sometimes also referred as patent trolls.88
PAEs have developed three different types of business models:89 They
sue and hope for a big jury award; they sue and negotiate quickly for a lowvalue settlement (leveraging high litigation costs); or they accumulate large
quantities of patents and license this portfolio (under the threat of suing
nonlicensed alleged infringers).90 Regardless of their business model, these
entities present major upsides and downsides.
On the one hand, PAEs provide inventors with the opportunity to raise
more funds from their patented innovation. PAEs transfer funds through
licensing or sales from technology users to patent holders.91
Since innovators receive more funds, PAEs should incentivize
inventors to innovate more.92 Assuming that an innovator is rational and
patents. As such, the PME term also encompasses entities that might use third-party NPEs to
assert patents for them.” The GAO study, supra note 23, at n. 6.
87. For an in-depth definition of nonpracticing entities and patent trolls, see for example
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUMB. L.
REV. 2117 (2013); Schwartz et al., supra note 22.
88. See, e.g., In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 165, 174 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011) (“‘nonpracticing entity’ or ‘NPE’ (sometimes disparagingly referred to as a ‘patent troll’).”). “Not all
NPEs are referred to as ‘patent trolls.’ For example, research universities may develop patented
technology but not practice the patents.” Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No.
12-CV-01143 YGR, 2013 WL 316023, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013).
89. Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, THE WHITE
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf (last visited Jan. 23,
2015). The Executive Office of the President has identified seven characteristics for these kinds
of patent assertion entities: “1. They do not “practice” their patents; that is, they do not do
research or develop any technology or products related to their patents; 2. They do not help with
“technology transfer” (the process of translating the patent language into a usable product or
process); 3. They often wait until after industry participants have made irreversible investments
before asserting their claims; 4. They acquire patents solely for the purpose of extracting
payments from alleged infringers; 5. Their strategies for litigation take advantage of their nonpracticing status, which makes them invulnerable to counter-claims of patent infringement; 6.
They acquire patents whose claim boundaries are unclear, and then (with little specific evidence
of infringement) ask many companies at once for moderate license fees, assuming that some will
settle instead of risking a costly and uncertain trial; 7. They may hide their identity by creating
numerous shell companies and requiring those who settle to sign non-disclosure agreements,
making it difficult for defendants to form common defensive strategies (for example, by sharing
legal fees rather than settling individually).”
90. Lemley et al., supra note 87, at 2126; The GAO study, supra note 22, at 14 (“some
stakeholders . . . said that they experienced a substantial amount of patent assertion without firms
ever filing lawsuits against them.”). These licenses have been referred as stick licenses, where
the potential infringer takes a license under threat of litigation.
91. Lemley et al., supra note 87, at 2124–25.
92. See Cottle et al., supra note 15, at 215 (discussing how “NPEs also introduce liquidity
into technology markets” because “when acquiring rights to an individual’s or a company’s patent
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risk neutral, she invests in innovating only if her expected benefits from
innovating outweigh her expected costs. This innovator forms expectations
about the value of her innovation. This valuation is based upon either
exploiting the innovation or licensing or selling it.
An innovator may opt to license her patent because she cannot exploit
it or simply because she prefers to let others exploit it. First, an innovator
may struggle to exploit her innovation because of budget constraints (e.g.,
costly product development or manufacturing), or because she lacks
necessary supporting patents, or because she lacks the clout to maximize
profits.93 Second, an innovator may simply specialize in R&D and prefer
to license instead of exploiting her innovation.
Regardless of her reasons, an innovator may struggle to license her
patent due to the licensing-related transaction costs. One study found94 that
a minority of companies licenses out their patents,95 but companies often
wish to license more.96 Companies mostly cite identifying licensing
partners as the most important problem –– above issues surrounding
licensing fees, negotiation costs, and technology advances.97
Innovators can benefit from an intermediary. Such an intermediary
has proven useful for small and medium enterprises in Korea.98 These
enterprises have used the services of the Korean Integrated Contract
Manufacturing Service to enhance their collaborative efforts and help them
“diffuse their innovative technologies.”99

or portfolio, the NPE acts as a technology broker and facilitates a robust technology
marketplace.”).
93. For instance, even if an innovator could exploit her patent, she may not profit because
she might not even have the resources to enforce her patent and exploit her monopoly. “[P]atent
enforcement has become financially undoable for small startup companies. NPEs provide an
avenue to protect assets that would otherwise be lost due to financial constraints.” Colleen V.
Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, NEW AM. FOUND., OPEN TECHN. INST. WHITE
PAPER 18 (2013).
94. Maria Pluvia Zuniga & Dominique Guellec, Who Licenses Out Patents and Why?
Lessons from a Business Survey (OECD Sci., Tech. and Indus. Working Papers, Working Paper
No. 2009/05, 2009), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/224447241101.
95. Twenty-seven percent of Japanese companies declared to license patents to
nonaffiliated partners while the corresponding figure for European companies is twenty percent.
Zuniga & Guellec, supra note 94, at 12.
96. Forty-five percent of European companies and eighty percent of Japanese companies
that already license want to license more. Zuniga & Guellec, supra note 95, at 20.
97. Zuniga & Guellec, supra note 94, at 21.
98. Sungjoo Lee, Gwangman Park, Byungun Yoon & Jinwoo Park, Open Innovation in
SMEs—An Intermediated Network Model, 39 RESEARCH POL’Y 290, 296–99 (2010).
99. Lee et al., supra note 98, at 296–99.
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PAEs can play this intermediary role and provide middlemen
services.100 PAEs, by definition, must repeatedly and profitably purchase
patents; therefore, they have the required skillset to price the patents
correctly. PAEs can use these interactions to build a network to identify
viable partners, to help innovators sell101 and price their innovation.102 As
such, they can serve as a hub for patents or market places.
By creating opportunities for licensing and sale revenues, PAEs
incentivize patenting innovation.103 Basic economics dictate that if the
innovation market functions efficiently, the presence of PAEs shifts the
patent demand curve. In the long term, the equilibrium supplied quantity
of patents should increase whereas the impact on the equilibrium price of
patent is ambiguous.
PAEs may encourage innovators to patent innovations that would not
have otherwise been patented; or they may also encourage innovators to
innovate more than they would otherwise have. Assuming that PAEs
encourage innovation, it is also ambiguous whether the incentivized
innovations are socially efficient innovations.104 On the one hand, the
PAEs that use the first business model105 rely on acquiring valuable patents
and enforcing them; these PAEs should encourage patenting valuable
innovations. On the other hand, second and third business-model PAEs do
not necessarily encourage socially efficient innovations and their patenting
100. See generally Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 315–17 (2010)
(discussing the role of intermediaries in the patent system, including the PAEs).
101. See generally Linus Dahlander & David M. Gann, How Open Is Innovation?, 39
RESEARCH POL’Y 699 (2010). Linus Dahlander & David M. Gann perform a review of the
literature on Open Innovation, a business model which relies on bringing inside a company
outside innovation and sending outside a company innovation. They highlight the literature that
discusses the issues with selling (or licensing) innovation. Id at 704. They highlight the issues
with disclosure, valuation, and technology transfer costs.
102. See generally James F. McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View
of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006) (NPEs
can then license or collect fees for these patents: they act as intermediaries and decrease
transaction costs for innovators who do not have the expertise to license their patent, to negotiate
fees, or enforce their patent. “These trolls act as a market intermediary in the patent market.
Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent markets ––
the same benefits securities dealers supply capital markets.”).
103. See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 82, at 434 (“By creating options to generate
rewards for innovators otherwise shutout of the marketplace . . . [t]ogether with contingency fee
lawyers whose business models depend on choosing the right patents and the right patentees,
NPEs can create important avenues for appropriating rewards for valuable patent rights that are
owned by non-market players.”).
104. A socially efficient innovation is an innovation whose social benefit from innovating
outweighs the social cost of innovating.
105. Executive Office of the Present, supra note 89.
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because they rent-seek based on nuisance demands/suits and scale
leveraging for revenues.106
Finally, first business model PAEs also provides a public good
because, through litigation, they challenge patents and establish their
boundaries.107 If an innovation is cumulative,108 then knowing the patent
boundaries helps subsequent innovators assess the innovation added value.
If a court validates a patent and sets its boundaries, a follow-on innovator
also knows whether to negotiate a license from the original patent holder.109
When second and third business model PAEs intervene, courts never have
a chance to assess a patent’s validity or boundaries.
On the other hand, PAEs disrupt innovation systems because they
impose additional costs upon innovators. First, they enforce patents that
may not have been enforced otherwise. For instance, the original patents
may not have been enforced because the original holder could not afford to
enforce. Some industries also have a culture of cross-licensing;110 hence,
putting patents in the hand of PAEs disrupts such culture.
Second, these entities have been heavily criticized in recent times as a
tax on innovation111 because they use their superior bargaining position to

106. Since the PAEs that deploy the third business model rely on acquiring a large portfolio
and leveraging them, they encourage patenting any innovation regardless of their added value.
107. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights,
5 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1715 (2008) (“When a firm gets a patent, it encloses the commons, making
private what would otherwise be public . . . But when a firm challenges a patent, it creates a
public good, because if it successfully challenges a patent, that piece of knowledge enters the
public domain, where anybody can use it. Thus, challenging a patent is a public good. The result,
of course, is that there will be an underinvestment in fighting bad patents, and an overinvestment
in trying to get bad patents.”).
108. For a broad discussion of cumulative innovation and the associated issues, see for
example Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991). In general, more frequently cited patents are more
valuable because their innovator-declared and implied value (using patent renewal as proxy) is
positively correlated to the number of citations. Dietmar Harhoff, Francis Narin, Frederic M.
Scherer & Katrin Vopel, Citation Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions, 81 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 511 (1999).
109. This has lead different countries to approach this issue differently. “For example, in the
United States, patent holders do not have a duty to license and their licensing actions are limited
only by antitrust law, but in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, compulsory license
statutes require patent holders to license their products.” T. R. Beard, George S. Ford, Thomas M.
Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Quantifying the Cost of Substandard Patents: Some Preliminary
Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH 240, 249 (2010).
110. Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 341 (2012)
(discussing the culture of cross-licensing among patent holders, which can become difficult with
the presence of PAEs).
111. Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Does Patent Licensing Mean Innovation? (Stan. L.
& Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 473, 2015).
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impose costs on innovators without providing added value. Their superior
bargaining position rests on their nonparticipation in the industry:
Innovators/alleged infringers have a product at stakes; they can be locked
into a technology with high switching cost; and they may have invested in
second-generation innovation, whereas PAEs are immune to cross-claims
because they have no products at stake.112 PAEs can leverage this position
and extract more rent from alleged infringers who fear large damages or an
injunction, which would prevent innovators from producing their
products.113
PAEs also burden the judicial system.114 Second business model
includes PAEs filing suits and negotiating low-value settlement; hence,
they require court intervention and clog dockets. Even though thirdbusiness-model PAEs rely on threats, they may need, from time to time, to
carry out their threats and file out a suit in order to substantiate these
threats.115 Under both business models, PAEs leverage litigation costs to
gain more profits.116
PAEs likely discourage socially efficient cumulative innovations
because they create uncertainties. They encourage innovators to patent
their inventions through financial incentives, some of which might not have
been patented otherwise. Therefore, PAEs feed into the system and make it
more difficult to see patent boundaries. This behavior of patenting more
innovations leads to patent thicket, “a term used to describe ‘a dense web
112. Only a small number of companies opt to switch products. Colleen Chien, Startups and
Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461 (2014) (explaining that faced with NPEs litigation 9%
of respondents decided to change their product). NPEs can exploit the switching cost from the
adopted technology to any alternative technology.
113. “The Federal Circuit focused on the high costs for defendants to defend, the burden of
complying with discovery, and the minimal risk to non-practicing entities because they have no
actual products at stake.” Summit Data Sys., LLC v EMC Corp., No. 10-749-GMS, 2014 WL
4955689, at *4 (D. Del. Sept. 25, 2014).
114. These entities have been associated with large social welfare impact. Bessen & Meurer,
supra note 82 (estimating that NPEs accrued $29 billion of direct costs in 2011).
115. “The typical scenario begins with an NPE contacting a targeted company through a
cease and desist letter accusing the company of infringing one or more of its patents. Soon after,
the NPE sends a request for royalty payments to the targeted company leaving the attached entity
with three options: (1) stop using the technology (and incur switching costs if alternatives are
available); (2) pay royalties to the NPE; or (3) face litigation.” Stefania Fusco, Markets and
Patent Enforcement: A Comparative Investigation of Non-Practicing Entities in the United States
and Europe, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439, 444 (2014).
116. Awarding attorney’s fees may solve some but not all problems because defendants
would still need to go through the court system. Christian Helmers, Brian Love & Luke
McDonagh, Is There a Patent Troll Problem in the U.K.?, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 509, 541–544 (2013) (arguing that the U.K. and the U.S. are similar in many respects
but the U.K. experience fewer PAE activities because the U.K. system shifts the litigation costs
onto the loser instead of each party paying for their own litigation costs).
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of overlapping intellectual property rights.’”117 Patent thickets impose a
cost upon innovators because innovators must check for possible
infringements or need to guess and estimate the boundaries of numerous
patents.118 PAEs, by indirectly encouraging patent thickets, increase the
cost and diminish the likelihood of subsequent innovations.119
“NPEs make innovation more expensive while, at the same time,
creating a secondary market for inventors with an uncertain beneficial
effect.”120 The overall theoretical impact of PAEs on patenting incentives
and, by proxy, on innovation incentives remains unclear.121 Survey
evidence has pointed out, however, that PAEs are not an efficient
middleman first, because PAEs usually sue before issuing a license122 and
second, because if a license is issued, it leads to no knowledge transfers,123
or only marginal improvements to products.124 The overall impact of PAEs
on innovation seems more negative than positive.
The relationship between PAEs and patenting is intricate: PAEs need
patents to thrive and they encourage patenting whether by providing a
market for innovation or by creating the need for practicing entities to
defend themselves. Patents have proliferated as shown by Figure 1: The
left axis shows the number of newly granted patents per year; the right axis
shows the number of patent suit filed and the number patent suits involving
117. Jaffe v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 14, 17 (4th Cir. 2013).
118. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
119. Lemley et al., supra note 85, at 2125 (arguing that “[b]y increasing the costs of using
technology, [NPEs] would . . . create deadweight, welfare-reducing loss by decreasing the use of
patented technologies and the manufacture and sale of products using patented technologies. In
addition, by increasing the costs of using patented technologies, they would reduce the use of
those technologies in research and development (R&D) and in follow-on inventions and thereby
reduce innovation.”).
120. Fusco, supra note 115, at 449.
121. Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L.
J. 463 (2014) (presenting a stylized model that describe under which conditions NPEs promote
innovation and benefit consumers and under which conditions they deter innovation and harm
consumers; concluding that, under anecdotal evidence, NPEs are more likely to deter innovation
and harm consumers).
122. Feldman & Lemley, supra note 111, at 23.
123. Feldman and Lemley argue that the traditional markers of knowledge transfer (technical
knowledge, personnel transfer, and joint venture creation) are not exhibited by these relationships.
Feldman & Lemley, supra note 111, at 25–28. Their survey also shows that relationship with
NPEs like universities also do not exhibit these markers. Feldman & Lemley, supra note 112 at
30–36.
124. “100% of respondents in both the computer & other electronics category and the
combined life sciences category reported that when licensing or settlement requests led to
licenses, the technology they licensed resulted in adding new products or features 0-10% of the
time.” Feldman & Lemley, supra note 111, at 38.
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PAEs. Between 2004 and 2013, inventors have filed patents at a faster
pace. Figure 1 also shows that patent suits have increased at an even faster
pace. The portion of patent suits that involve NPEs has also increased
dramatically over the period and seems to drive the increase in patent suit
filings.

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Granted Patents

Patent Suit Filings

Patent Lawsuits Involving PAEs

Figure 1: Patents Granted and Patent Suits Filed between 2004 and 2013.
(Source: USPTO; Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts,
Patent Freedom)

The growth of patents and PAE activities is hard to disentangle. On
the one hand, a PAE can only file a suit after an inventor files a patent and
sells it to them; hence, patent filings influence the likelihood of patent suits
and PAE’s activities. On the other hand, a PAE encourages patent filing
for defensive purposes and by doing so provides innovators with financial
alternatives. The next section discusses how this can have an impact on
startups and how innovation incentive affects their financing and VC
funding. It investigates in more detail the impact of PAEs on patenting
activities.
B. Spotting Innovation in the Software Industry

PAEs have operated in many industries, but they have concentrated in
the Information and Communication Technology (ICT).125 The ICT
industry and in particular the software industry have been heavily impacted

125. Bessen, Ford, and Meurer use industry codes (SIC) and estimate that 22 percent of NPE
cases involved a defendant in the electronics industry, 15 percent in machinery and computer
equipment, 14 percent in software, and 9 percent in communications between 1990 and 2010.
Bessen, Ford & Meurer, supra note 27, at 29. From surveys, Chien reports that 88 percent of IT
VCs received demands of their portfolios as compared to biotechnology/pharmaceutical/medical
device VCs of whom only 13 percent received demands. Chien, supra note 93, at 11.
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by the rise of PAEs:126 since 2005, the majority of PAE suits have come
from high-tech industry and about 42 percent of the litigated patents by
PAEs come from the ICT industry.127
PAEs can take advantage of the software industry’s characteristics:
broad patents and patent abundance. First, patents in the ICT industry and
particularly in the software industry tend to be broad because software
patents use functionality language (what something does) instead of
descriptive language (what it is).128 A broad patent leads “to a lack of
understanding of patent claims and, therefore, what constitutes
infringement.”129 In some instance, patents could even overlap.
Second, the abundance of patent increases the costs and decreases the
benefits of patent searches for innovators. This abundance leads to patent
thickets,130 which complicates identifying the relevant patents.131 Figure 2
shows on the left axis the number of newly granted patents for all USPTO
categories and on the right axis the number of newly granted software
patents.132 This figure shows that the number of software patents has
increased at a faster rate than the total number of patents.
126. “As many as 55% of all patent defendants and 82% of PAE (“patent troll”) defendants
have been sued on the basis of a software patent.” Colleen Chien & Aashish Karkhanis, Software
Patents & Functional Claiming, Presentation to the 2/12/13 Software PTO Roundtable at SLS
(2013) http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/software_ak_cc_sw.pdf (last visited Jan. 23,
2015).
127. Patent Freedom, an organization that gathers data on NPE activities, reports in Exposure
by Industry that in each year from 2005 to 2012, over 51 percent of NPE suits are from high-tech
industry. Aggregating the computer hardware, software, services, media and telecom, and semiconductors show that ICT accounted for 42 percent of litigated patents by NPEs. https://www.
patentfreedom.com/about-npes/industry/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
128. Executive Office of the President, supra note 89, at 8.
129. The GAO study, supra note 22, at 28–30.
130. Timo Fischer & Philipp Ringler, The Coincidence of Patent Thickets – A Comparative
Analysis, TECHNOVATION, December 2014, at Fig. 3 and Table 1.
131. “[T]he sheer volume of patents makes searching for relevant patents before developing
new products particularly difficult, especially for products that combine many patented
technologies.” The GAO study, supra note 22, at 30–31.
132. Software patents include patents granted by USPTO under 14 different classifications
according to the methodology provided by Stuart J.H. Graham & David C. Mowery, The Use of
Intellectual Property in Software: Implications for Open Innovation, in OPEN INNOVATION:
RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM 184 (Henry Chesbrough et al., eds., 2006): 324 (Electricity:
Measuring and Testing), 345 (Computer Graphics Processing and Selective Visual Display
Systems), 369 (Dynamic Information Storage or Retrieval), 700 (Data Processing: Generic
Control Systems or Specific Applications), 701 (Data Processing: Vehicles, Navigation, and
Relative Location), 703 (Data Processing: Structural Design, Modeling, Simulation, and
Emulation), 707 (Data Processing: Database and File Management or Data Structures), 709
(Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Multicomputer Data Transferring), 704
(Data Processing: Speech Signal Processing, Linguistics, Language Translation, and Audio
Compression/Decompression), 710 (Electrical Computers and Digital Data Processing Systems:
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Figure 2: Patents Granted for Software and All Category Patents between 2004 and 2013.
(Source: USPTO)

VCs invest in this patent ecosystem of broad, unclear, and abundant
patents. Not only patents lose value as an asset, they also lose their value
as a signal: VCs will struggle more and more to assess patent value and
innovation potential in the software industry. VCs might wish to perform
patent searches to assure that the companies in which they invest do not
repeat patented innovation and do not infringe on existing invention.
However, patent searches are expensive and having to perform searches
nullifies some of the patent signaling value because its value can no longer
be readily assessed at no cost.
VCs might request that innovators perform searches before investing
but innovators have little incentive to perform patent searches before
innovating. If an innovator encounters a relevant patent, during their
search, on which they may infringe, then, during litigation, this knowledge
may support a willful infringement theory and lead to higher damages.133
Even if an innovator performs a search, she may struggle to find the patent
owner because the PTO does not register transfers. This is also true if
PAEs hold these patents because, by definition, PAEs purchased their
portfolio from innovators.134

Input/Output), 711 (Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Memory), 713
(Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Support), 715 (Data Processing:
Presentation Processing of Document, Operator Interface Processing, and Screen Saver Display
Processing), and 717 (Data Processing: Software Development, Installation, and Management).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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PAEs that file nuisance suits or leverage their portfolio135 can thrive in
this software patent ecosystem because an alleged infringer is less likely to
take a risk and challenge patents whose identities and boundaries are
uncertain.
In effect, software innovators are caught in a vicious circle: broad
software patents lead to patent thickets; patent thickets lead to less preinvention patent searches; fewer searches increases infringement
likelihood. PAEs feed into this equation: they encourage patenting and
broad software patent; and they increase search cost for patent owners.
VCs also feed into this equation: They encourage patenting and selling
these patents for scrap.
For VCs, patents should become more of a shield against suits than a
proof of innovativeness or even an asset to sell in case of failure. The
correlation and possibly the causation between patent lawsuits, PAE
activities (observed in Figure 1) and patenting activities (observed in
Figure 2) seems to point out that: with more patents comes more
opportunity to file lawsuits; as PAEs accumulate more patents over the
years, they have more opportunities to file lawsuits; and as they become
more active, they create a higher cost on the system. The relationship
between PAEs and VCs lies through the patents they respectively purchase
and sell, and through the companies they respectively sue and finance. The
next section attempts to answer how VCs have reacted to PAEs activities.

IV. The Impact of Patent Assertion Entities on
Venture Capital Funds
VCs and PAEs are repeat players targeting the same type of
companies. VCs traditionally invest in very small companies and PAEs
target small as much as large companies, if not more. One study reports
that “companies with less than $10M of annual revenue represented at least
55% of unique PAE defendants, bringing 26% of PAE defenses.”136

135. As discussed previously, PAEs use three essential business models: litigation for large
jury award; leveraging high litigation costs for quick and low-value settlement; large portfolio
leveraging to induce licenses. Lemley, et al., supra note 87, at 2126.
136. Chien, supra note 112, at 471; Morton et al., supra note 121, found that in 2013
defendants earning less than $10 million in revenues constituted 55 percent of unique defendants
and 35 percent of total defendants. Id. at Figure 3. In 2015, Feldman et al., supra note 111,
reported that in their sample of 102 companies, 71 percent of companies that received request had
over $100 million in revenues. Id. at 18; Chien, supra note 93, reports that from a survey of 307
venture capital or investors and startups, 35 had received demands and 75 percent of the
companies reported revenue under $10 million. Id. at 10. NPEs do not spare small companies nor
wait for them to become large in order to exercise pressure.
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Unsurprisingly, a survey of 114 VC showed that “75% responded that
NPEs had made demands of their portfolio.”137
PAEs may target VC backed startups. By definition, VC backed
companies receive funds; hence, PAEs know that their demand can be
honored. PAEs can also strategically time their demand for further
gains.138 Some startups’ funding events (e.g., obtaining seed money, doing
later stage rounds of financing, or going through an IPO) receive
publicity.139 Because litigations can impact their valuation,140 fund seeking
companies will yield to PAE demands more easily –– even if they are
unfunded.
A. Empirical Evidence

According to the previous argument, PAEs should impact VC
activities. In this section, I test the relationship between PAE activities,
patenting activities, and VC activities at a macro level. I collected data on:
the number of patents granted annually sorted by category from the
USPTO;141 patent suits from the yearly United States Courts statistics;142
PAE activities from Patent Freedom;143 and venture capital funding from
the Dow Jones database.144 Some of this data was used to graph Figure 1
and Figure 2. The data covers the period from 2004 to 2013.
I test the following relationship:

VC activities are represented by three variables: the number of
software companies who receive funds; the total VC-funds invested in

137. Chien, supra note 112, at 471.
138. Morton et al., supra note 121, at 474–75.
139. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1320.
140. Bessen, Ford, & Meurer, supra note 27, estimate that NPEs have led to a trillion dollars
of lost wealth from NPEs suing public traded companies.
141. Patent Counts By Class By Year January 1977—December 2014, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm (last visited
May 28, 2015).
142. Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts, U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports (last visited May 28, 2015).
143. RPX CORPORATION, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations/ (last visited
May 28, 2015).
144. VENTURESOURCE DOW JONES, https://www.venturesource.com (last visited May 28,
2015). The dataset contained 8,777 companies; after removing companies that did not have an
industry affiliation, and did not have an amount funded, the dataset yield 15,800 transactions ––
as some companies received more than one round of funding.
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software companies; and the average VC-funds invested in software
companies.
Legal activities are represented by two variables: number of patent
lawsuits; and the number of NPE lawsuits. Patenting activity is represented
by the number of patents granted.
Since the period covers the financial crisis, financial shocks are likely.
To control for these economic shocks, the estimation will include same
variables for non-software companies. The underlying assumption is that
software and non-software companies were impacted in the same way by
economic shocks.
Since I would like to test whether PAE activities impacted VC
funding, I must address the following two issues. First, the discussion
above highlighted that PAE activities, patenting, and VC funding show
signs of simultaneity as well as feedback loops. To address these potential
endogeneity problems, the relationships are tested through fixed effect
estimations, which focus on the impact of the change in the independent
variables onto the change in the dependent variable.145 Second, I test the
impact of the lagged legal activity and the lagged patenting activity because
I hypothesize that VC activities are impacted by legal and patenting
activities after these activities are observed. Thus, I hypothesis that: in year
one, VCs observe the level of legal and patenting activity and fundraise;146
and in year two, they invest these funds.
The reason for using one-year lag for patenting activity is twofold.
First, VC funds often base their funding upon patent applications and not
necessary on patents granted because USPTO takes on average three years
to grant patents at which point startups already need and receive funding.
Looking at patent granted more than a year prior to funding would arguably
not reflect the actual VC decisions. Therefore, having older granted patents
should not improve the results.147 Second, econometrically, adding more
lagged software is problematic because of the sample size; it decreases the
145. Fixed effect estimations focus on the change in a variable or more precisely on how a
variable differs from its average value. Using the first difference provides a similar result but
since only eight years of data are available, fixed effect avoids losing a variable. To avoid
complicating the text unnecessarily, I write, for instance, that PAE activities impact VC activities
whereas I am actually testing whether deviating from the mean PAE activity impacts deviating
from the mean VC activity. As such, is not computed because it is the average activity.
146. VC funds invest their money after they raised the whole fund, which may take up to a
year. One study reports that the investment duration period, time between the first investment
and the last investment, lasts between one to two years. Douglas J. Cumming, The Determinants
of Venture Capital Portfolio Size: Empirical Evidence, 79 J. BUS. 1083 (2006).
147. Assuming that VCs base their funding decisions upon older patent portfolio, patent
lawsuits may be. In other words, the number of patents granted beyond the previous year may
impact the number of software companies receiving financing.
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accuracy of the results. For completeness, I attempted to add more lag
years for patents but it did not improve the results and the results did not
lead to statistically significant effects.
When the VC activity is measured by the number of software
companies who receive funds, I expect this number to decrease as more
lawsuits are filed and more PAEs are active because VC-backed software
companies are prime targets and become less attractive as investments as
compared to other opportunities that are not targeted by PAEs. If VC funds
are not deterred from investing, litigation activities may also increase the
number of companies in which VC funds are invested because they want to
diversify their risk and invest in more companies in case a lawsuit destroys
their investment.
When the VC activity is measured by the total VC-funds invested in
software companies, I expect this number to either increase or decrease. It
may decrease if VC funds are deterred from investing in these companies
because of the fear of losing their investments. It may increase if they are
not deterred because in spite of this “innovation tax” VCs still profit from
their investment but must pay part of the profits to this innovation tax.
When the VC activity is measured by the average VC-funds invested
in software companies, I expect this number to either increase or decrease
for the same reasons. The results of these fixed effect estimates are
presented in Table 1.
In the first specification, the number of patent lawsuits in year one has
a positive and statistically significant effect at the 10 percent level on the
number of software companies in year two. The number of patents granted
in year one does not have a statistically significant effect on the number of
software companies in year two.
In the fourth specification, PAE filings in year one do not have a
statistically significant effect on the number of software companies in year
two. The impact of patents granted in year one does not have a statistically
significant effect.
In the second specification, patent lawsuits in year one have a positive
and statistically significant effect on the total funds software companies
receive in year two. The number of software patents granted in year one
has a negative and statistically significant effect the VC-funds software
companies receive in year two.
In the fifth specification, patent lawsuits and PAE filings in year one
has a positive and statistically significant effect on total funds software
companies receive in year two. The number of software patents granted in
year one has a negative but not statistically significant effect on the average
funds software companies receive in year two.

9 - GABISON_PAE-EDITED-PROD-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

WINTER 2016]

Lagged patent
lawsuits

11/13/2015 3:41 PM

PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY
Number of
VC-backed
software
companies

Total VC
amount
invested in
software
companies

Average VC
investment in
software
companies

0.14*

1.07**
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0.003*

.0008
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-0.00006
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0.25

0.27

8

8

8

8

0.94
0.95
0.21
the coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level
**
the coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level

0.90

0.95

0.52

R2

8

8

0.47

*

Table 1: Fixed Effects Regressions of the Macro-Level Impact of PAE Activities

In the third specification, patent litigation in year one does not have a
statistically significant effect on the average amount received by company
in year two. In the sixth specification, PAE activities in year one have a
positive and statistically significant effect on the average amount received
by company in year two at the 10 percent level. In these two
specifications, the explanatory power of the fixed effects estimates is much
lower than under other specifications.
In general, lawsuits and PAE have impacted VC activities. First, as
expected, PAEs have a greater impact than lawsuits in general when
comparing specifications 1 and 4, 2 and 5, and 3 and 6. While the
coefficients of these legal activities are consistent, they do not always
produce statistically significant effects. PAE activities impacted the total
and average amount invested in software companies in a statistically
significant way whereas lawsuits impacted the number of software
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companies that received VC funds and the total amount VC funds invested
in a statistically significant way.
Second, these results are probative of some correlation but not
causation. PAE activities spur VC to invest more into software companies
and this can be interpreted in two ways: On the one hand, VCs end up
paying part of the rent raised by PAE and much like a tax, these rent is
passed on to all market participants including investors like VCs; on the
other hand, VCs may invest more into software companies because now if
the companies fail, VCs can sell the patents to VC funds.
However, I would argue that this second explanation does not hold
because the number of software patent granted has a negative effect on the
total and average amount received by VC-backed software companies
(which is statistically significant in specification 2 and 6). In other words,
since granted software allows companies to protect themselves against
demand, these companies require fewer funds. This overall, supports the
hypothesis that VCs infuse funds to pay for PAE demands.148
In other words, VC funds seem to finance the litigious activities of
their investments. The extra funds invested might also be later transferred
to PAEs. Not only do VC funds indirectly pay a part of the PAE burden,
they act like an insurance company by spreading the risk of PAE activities
across all their investments and increasing the pool of companies in which
they invest.
The data provides some level of detail about who receive the VC
funds: the funds can be divided according to the timing to the investment or
investment rounds: seed round, first round, second round, and later round.
This nomenclature parallels the development stages during which the
company fundraises. After dividing the data according to the investment
stage and focusing on PAE activities, the relationship between the variables
are further investigated. Table 2 summarizes the results of these
investigations.
The seed round results show that PAE activities in year one do not
have a statistically significant effect on VC behavior in year two at the seed
round. VC funds may not be reacting to PAE activities at the seed round
because PAE do not focus on seed companies. Seed software startups
receive on average $630,000 (and non-software seed startups receive
$780,000) as compared to companies in the first round who receive on
average $4 million (and $5.5 million respectively), in the second round
who receive $6.2 million (and $7.9 million respectively), in the later stages
148. VC funds invest fewer funds because patents can be used as shield against litigation and
hence patent protection decreases the VC investment’s exposure to suits whereas if patents were
valuable assets, as more patents are granted, VC should invest more.
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who receive $8.5 million (and $11.5 million respectively). Thus, the
relatively small amount that seed startups receive may not attract PAEs and
explains why their activity does not have a statistically significant effect on
VC funding activities.
The first round results show that PAE activities only have a positive
and statistically significant effect on the total amount invested by VC into
software companies. Taking all three results together seems to imply that
overall VCs have invested more money because of PAE activities but the
increase per company is only marginal. From year to year, the average
amount software companies receive at the seed stage has oscillated around
the $4 million without much deviation.
The second round results show that PAE activities in year one had a
positive and statistically significant effect on the change in the total amount
invested by VC into software companies in year two and on the total
amount invested by VC into software companies in year two; but, it did not
have a statistically significant effect on the average amount invested by VC
into software companies in year two.
These results seem to imply that VCs have increased the amount they
invest overall in companies at the second round of financing but also they
have invested in more companies at this investment round. These results
support that VC funds seem to diversify their risk while paying part of the
innovation tax.
The later round results show that the change in PAE activities in year
one had a positive and statistically significant effect on all three dependent
variables in year two. These correlations support the assertion that VC
funds observed PAE activities and reacted in response to their increased
activities by increasing the amount invested overall and on average as well
as spreading the funds invested to more companies.
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VC activities have been most affected by PAE activities in the second
and later round the most. First, from a cost benefit analysis standpoint,
PAEs may focus their activities where they may profit the most. PAEs
may have targeted companies that are in later rounds of fundraising
because these companies receive more funds and can afford to pay
demands. These companies also have more (financial backing) to lose;
hence, they may be more willing to settle. If PAEs had targeted seed and
first stage startups who cannot defend themselves or do not know how, the
effect has not been statistically significant at the macro level. Anecdotal
evidence discussed above shows that PAEs have made demands from all
companies; hence, PAEs may have had a disparate effect.
Second and late stage startups are older startups, which are more
likely to have been granted a patent. Thus, they are more likely to bse able
to defend themselves against demands. VC funds could have perceived
these type of companies as safer investments and decide to invest more into
these later stage ventures in year two once they observe more PAE
activities in year one.
Some VCs specialize in rounds and only invest in seed or late stage
startups whereas others invest in a balanced portfolio. Since I cannot
control for the origin of the funding, it is impossible to determine whether
PAEs may have led to a shift in the behavior for VCs with a balance
portfolio.149
Over the period, VC funds have invested more in later stage startups
overall and on average (a 53 percent increase in the average amount
received by later stage software companies and 16 percent increase for nonsoftware companies). In comparison, between 2005 and 2012, seed
startups received fewer funds on average (a 7 percent decrease in the
average amount received by software startups and 24 percent for nonsoftware startups).
This increase may also be due to the financial crisis. The nonsoftware VC investment variables all have a statistically significant effect
on the dependent variables for the late stage estimations. More mature
companies may have received more funds during the period because they
were viewed as more likely to survive.
Once more, VC funds do not seem to invest more because PAEs
purchase patents: the number of granted patents by the USPTO has a
negative effect on VCs investment when statistically significant. This

149. Round specialized VCs may no change their behavior without important switching cost
linked to the partnership agreement when the VC was set up.
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supports the notion that VC funds have valorized patents as a mean to
protect against PAE activities.
However, these estimations have limitations. I can only use eight
years of macro-level data. Data on individual companies and the PAE
demands they receive may help further answer these questions particularly
because numerous demands may not take the form of a suit. As such, a
micro-level investigation may provide a better understanding of VC
behavior in the face of PAE demands.
Even with these limitations, these estimations support the notion that
VC funds may have impacted their financing behavior because of PAE
activities. Further investigations of these issues may be required to draw a
more accurate conclusion about the actual micro level impact.
B. What can VCs do?

PAEs are active in the software and tech industry and VCs invest in
these industries.150 As repeat players, VCs need be aware of PAEs and
adjust their business model accordingly151 because small companies and
startups hardly benefit from PAEs through patent sales.152 The VC
adjustments come at three stages: preinvestment, during investment, and
post-investment.
Preinvestment VCs may wish to stop valorizing patent as signal. This
approach feeds into the PAE problem. Since innovators who patent are
more likely to receive funds, this added incentive leads to more patents,
which may later be sold to PAEs. More patents also increase the likelihood
of patent thickets, where PAEs thrive.
VCs need to realign their cultural approach to patents and possibly
more in line with startup innovators. “While most surveyed VCs were
positive about patents, startup survey respondents tended to express more
anti-patent sentiments.”153 VCs need not rely on patents for investing
because they can use other metrics or tools. In the software industry, VCs
have used software downloads, network size, and other performance
measures to invest.154 VCs should eliminate their reliance on patents

150. From 66 VC funds, 88 percent responded that PAEs made demands of companies in
their portfolios. Chien, supra note 112, at 471–72.
151. Some market participants have expressed certainties about PAE demands showing that
companies and VCs are aware of their presence. Chien, supra note 112, at Table 1.
152. Larger companies benefit from selling their patents to PAE as “50% of PAE patents
come from companies with under $200M in annual revenue.” Chien, supra note 112, at 469.
153. Chien, supra note 93, at 21–22.
154. See Mario Schaarschmidt & Harold von Kortzfleisch, Examining Investment Strategies
of Venture Capitalists in Open Source Software, 11 INT’L J. INNOVATION AND TECH.
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altogether. The information gained through using patents is only marginal
from the information a VC could gain through a nondisclosure agreement
with a fund-seeking venture. Furthermore, they may pass by socially and
privately efficient innovation that may not be patentable.
Pre-investment, VCs should create an environment where PAE
demands should not become taboo. A rational VC expects PAE demands
and accounts for them ex-ante. By penalizing fund-seeking companies if
they receive PAE demands, VCs encourage companies to hide these
demand, which lead to further information asymmetries and also
companies to yield to PAE demands to hide them. In other words, VCs
indirectly incentivize their companies to yield to demands. Without precise
information, VCs will spread the cost of PAEs over its entire portfolio and
act as insurance companies for their portfolio innovative startups.155 This
phenomenon spreads the PAE innovation tax beyond the concerned
company and industry.
Once they have invested, VCs can help their startups to anticipate
PAE demands. First, VCs can encourage their portfolio companies to
exercise more caution to perform patent searches at the onset. VC backed
companies already perform more patent searches than the general
population of companies.156 In the IT industry, VCs need to double their
efforts: even though PAEs are more active in ICT, IT innovators perform
fewer patent searches than other industries;157 and VC-backed companies
only perform marginally more patent searches than non-VC backed
companies.158
MANAGEMENT 1 (2014). The authors discuss how VCs have invested in Open Source Software.
Id. They discuss how by definition those VCs do not rely on intellectual property to profit but
instead of other business model (e.g., sale of complementary services) and have relied on other
performance indicators and methods to select ventures. Id.
155. In equilibrium, since VCs expect a certain level of PAE demands, they have already
adjusted on all their offers to all their ventures. Because these costs remain inaccurate without
disclosure between entrepreneurs and VCs, the venture capitals will on average overestimate the
demand than underestimate. Thus, this PAE tax affects venture more than necessary because of
these information asymmetries. As a tax, PAEs deter investments in seemingly lower-innovativepotential ventures because high-innovative-potential ventures remain attractive investments.
156. “A substantial share of the respondents to this question reported regularly doing patent
searches. . . . Among the venture-backed sample, searching was substantially more common.”
Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1321.
157. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1321. The authors found that nine in ten biotechnology
and medical devices companies perform patent searches whereas only six in ten IT companies
and three in ten software companies amongst VC backed companies. Id.
158. “[S]lightly less than one-quarter of software companies reported doing regular patent
searches . . . [and] nearly three in ten venture-backed software startups.” Id. See GAO Study,
supra note 22, at 30 (anecdotally comparing the search cost technology industry and
pharmaceutical industry).
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VCs need to further encourage patent searches as best practices; but,
VCs should also request these patent searches to be performed as soon as
possible.159 Patent searches have a real cost, which will partially be passed
on to innovation users and will decrease the overall innovation value.
However, search costs avoid larger litigation costs later. Furthermore,
patent searches have positive externalities because companies do not
inefficiently repeat existing research: If an innovation exists, the startup can
try to obtain a license. These best practices, once implemented, benefit
startups now and in the future.160
Aside from avoiding demands, VCs can play a role in countervailing
PAE unreasonable demands. As an industry repeat player, VCs know the
reputation of PAEs better than new innovators; hence, they can mentor
innovators to deal with these demands.161
VCs value patents as a shield against demands. Individual rationality
dictates that VCs push for patenting instead of trade secret because trade
secrets do not protect them against attacks.162 However, having a software
patent does not protect against PAE demands because the PAE-offensive
and the startup-defensive patents still need to be compared, contrasted, and
litigated in court. PAEs’ second and third business model gamble on
startups being cash-strapped and thus challenge patents in court ––
regardless of the claim validity.
Post-investment, VCs should, however, avoid selling their portfolio
companies’ patents to PAEs. The majority of startups, particularly
software startups, do not have patents; if they do, they only sell them

159. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1322-23. The authors discuss the timing of the patent
search and argue that companies “put off costly searching until they are more certain of the
economic value of a technology.” Id. A startup may need to perform some research before they
can identify the problems needing solving; hence, a patent search many be impossible until later
in the innovation process. Id.
160. Annalisa Croce, José Martí & Samuele Murtinu, The Impact of Venture Capital on the
Productivity Growth of European Entrepreneurial Firms: ‘Screening’ or ‘Value added’ Effect?,
28 J. BUS. VENTURING 489 (2013) empirically test and find that VC-backed companies have
higher level of productivity than comparable non-VC backed companies once VC invest and that
these VC investments have a long term effect on the company’s productivity: the VC exit has no
negative impact on labor, capital, and total factor productivity. Id. They conclude that VCs have
an imprinting effect (performance persistence after the exit) because VCs provide value-adding
services like coaching and mentoring. Id.
161. Chien describes in Appendix C a number of patent defense service providers and
offerings and as repeat players, VCs are better placed to encourage the user of these services.
Chien, supra note 93, at 52 app. c.
162. Patents also provide some monopoly power for their portfolio companies but these
startups can find it too costly to enforce their own patents.
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during transition or distressful times.163 This decision to refuse to sell to
PAEs is socially and individually rational: in the future, their portfolio
companies are likely to receive demand from PAEs. And because VCs
operate in a given industry, the patents they sell to PAEs can come back
and haunt them.
VCs can benefit from keeping the patents of their failed companies to
pass on to future startups, or putting them into a patent pool on behalf of
their portfolio companies, or selling them to practicing entities. For
instance, Google has recently attempted to purchase the patents of
distressed companies and innovators to circumvent them selling to PAEs
and reappearing as a threat later.164

V. Conclusion
PAEs’ demands do not create the same impact on larger companies as
they do on smaller ones.165 These demands unsettle the operation of small
companies, whose responses vary from product changes to fighting the
issues in court.166 VC funds operate within the realm of these small
companies. They have a chance to diminish the impact of PAEs.
Even though a company’s profit potential is hard to assess ex-ante,
investors must stop putting such an emphasis on patents in their decisionmaking. Such emphasis becomes detrimental to innovation because
innovators are over-incentivized to invest in patents instead of investing in
innovations.
These issues are exacerbated in the software industry. VC funds and
PAEs have constant run-ins. VCs pressure their portfolio companies to
patent, which feeds even further into the PAE problem: More patenting
leads to more patent thickets and more patenting opens the door to more
patents available for sale to PAEs if the startup fails. Therefore, VCs
indirectly put their future investment at a competitive disadvantage.

163. Chien, supra note 93, at 479–80. Note that selling should be distinguished from
monetizing via licensing here because a previous OECD research found that smaller and larger
companies had a higher propensity to license than medium size companies as measured by
employees. Zuniga, supra note 94, at 13 tbl.2. However, age of the companies did not seem to
play an important factor. Id. at 15 tbl.6.
164. Allen Lo, Announcing the Patent Purchase Promotion, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG
(Apr. 27, 2015), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com.es/2015/04/announcing-patent-purchasepromotion.html.
165. Chien explains that “The smaller the company, the less able it was to absorb the impact
of a lawsuit without a significant impact: the smallest companies reported the highest rate, while
companies over $100M in revenue reported no impact from troll suits, even though they were
sued at a much higher frequency than small companies in the sample.” Chien, supra note 112, at
475.
166. Chien, supra note 112, at 473 tbl.1.
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The software industry lends itself to the proliferation of PAEs. Their
proliferation makes assessing the value of innovations even more difficult.
As a result, VC fund activities have been in part affected by PAE activities
and VCs are paying for the activities of PAEs. In the future, VCs should
aim to decrease the chances of having to respond to PAEs’ demands.

